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In electric power systems delivering alternating current, it is essential to maintain its synchrony of the phase with
the rated frequency. The synchronization stability that quantifies how well the power-grid system recovers its syn-
chrony against such perturbation depends on various factors. As an intrinsic factor that we can design and control, the
transmission capacity of the power grid affects the synchronization stability. Therefore, the transition pattern of the
synchronization stability with the different levels of transmission capacity against external perturbation provides the
stereoscopic perspective to understand the synchronization behavior of power grids. In this study, we extensively inves-
tigate the factors affecting the synchronization stability transition by using the concept of basin stability as a function
of the transmission capacity. For a systematic approach, we introduce the integrated basin instability, which literally
adds up the instability values as the transmission capacity increases. We first take simple 5-node motifs as a case study
of building blocks of power grids, and a more realistic IEEE 24-bus model to highlight the complexity of decisive fac-
tors. We find that both structural properties such as gate keepers in network topology and dynamical properties such as
large power input/output at nodes cause synchronization instability. The results suggest that evenly distributed power
generation and avoidance of bottlenecks can improve the overall synchronization stability of power-grid systems.
In modern society, power grids play an essential role
as one of the most important infrastructures by providing
electrical energy. As the structure and the operation strat-
egy of power grids are becoming more complex, designing
and managing the power grids for stable electricity sup-
ply are also becoming a harder challenge. The problem of
course belongs to the field of electrical engineering with
all of the complicated practical matters, but there have
been significant endeavors to analyze it with only the most
essential ingredients, starting from arguably the simplest
one: the topology of power grids as mathematical objects
represented by graphs or networks. Initiated solely from
this structural aspect, the past decades have witnessed the
drastic advancement in the field of power-grid research,
powered by the theoretical and practical tools of network
science combined with nonlinear dynamics. One of the
most quintessential approaches is the stability analysis of
synchronization among power-grid nodes. It is known that
the transmission capacity affects the synchronization sta-
bility. In the light of the fluctuating transmission capacity
in real power grids, we investigate what structural and dy-
namical factors make the dynamic stability of power grids
resilient over a range of transmission capacity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The synchronization stability of individual nodes in a power
grid quantifies how much each node can sustain its synchrony
against external disturbance to the node’s dynamic variables1.
Based on the nodal synchronization stability, studies have re-
vealed various topological and functional properties of power
grids to explain what makes power grids solidly synchro-
nized2–10. Those power-grid studies on synchronization sta-
bility utilize the capacity of transmission lines as a key param-
eter. The transmission capacity affects the synchronization
stability of nodes, sometimes non-monotonically10. However,
it has yet to be understood crystal clear how the unique transi-
tion patterns of the nodal synchronization stability are related
to other network properties.
In this study, we investigate the transition pattern of the
nodes in two power-grid models: the 5-node motifs as theoret-
ical basic building blocks of power grids and the IEEE 24-bus
model11,12 as a representative practical case from the engi-
neering point of view. We introduce an integrated measure
of basin (in)stability to comprehensively capture the transi-
tion pattern of the synchronization stability and reveal that the
large amount of power input/output and the topological gate-
keeper structure can be general signatures of unstable nodes.
We begin our paper by briefly guiding the readers through
the historical development of power-grid studies that utilize
the network perspective over the past decades in Sec. II, on
which our contribution in this work introduced at the end of
the section is based. The main part of our contribution in-
troduces the basic theoretical framework in Sec. III and the
power-grid models in Sec. IV. We present the main results
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2and implications in Sec. V, and conclude our work in Sec. VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF NETWORK-BASED APPROACHES
A. Purely structural approaches
In the early 2000s, the nascent field of network science13,14,
equipped with an explosively increasing amount of various
types of real data, started to analyze an intrinsically net-
worked system of power grids as well. At that time, re-
searchers mainly focused on the structural properties, for in-
stance, the resilience of power-grid networks under random
failures or intentional attacks15. By taking this approach, Al-
bert et al.16 estimated the vulnerability of the North Ameri-
can power grid in response to intentional attacks by remov-
ing nodes based on the number of connected neighbors (de-
gree) and the amount of net power input of each node, and
then compared the result to that from random attack. Sim-
ilar approaches were conducted based on betweenness—the
fraction of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes that go
through the node of interest—to the power grids of the western
United States17, Italy18, the North America19, and the West-
ern China20. Crucitti et al. used the link betweenness (the
same concept as the aforementioned betweenness but assigned
to transmission lines instead of nodes) to identify the critical
lines and suggested to install a few new lines at specific loca-
tions to improve the robustness of Spanish, French, and Italian
power grids21.
These seminal studies successfully projected power grids
on the framework of network science by applying elementary
topological properties such as degree, betweenness, and size
of connected components. However, as any other types of
real-world network data went through, researchers began to
realize the limitation of these highly simplified approaches.
Take the betweenness, for instance. In an ideal world, of
course, the shortest path assumed to be used in calculating
the betweenness is the most efficient and desirable one for the
transmission of electricity. In reality, though, it is known that
the power produced by local generators is more likely to be
transmitted to the nearest substations due to various practical
reasons (in this case, the geographical constraint) that the sim-
ple network analysis cannot capture19. Therefore, it is abso-
lutely required to bring such specific contexts of power grids
before blindly applying only the topological part of network
analysis.
B. Direct current approximation to find critical lines
A power grid is a special type of distribution network where
electrical currents flow from power sources, i.e., power gener-
ators to power sinks, i.e., consumers. The direct current (DC)
approximation assumes the DC flowing from the highest elec-
tric potential at the generators to the lowest electric potential
at the consumers, just as water flows from the highest moun-
tain top to the lowest valley. This assumption is of course not
technically correct, as most infrastructural power grids in the
world use the alternating current (AC) as a result of the fa-
mous current war between Nikola Tesla and Thomas Edison.
However, the DC approximation has the merit in its simplic-
ity without taking all of the complicated factors of phases and
the rated frequency, so it has been widely used as the proxy of
real-world power-grid failure as a result of overloading.
Simply put, when the amount of the current flow exceeds
the capacity of a transmission line, the line is overloaded and
thus fails. Estimating the current flow with the DC approxima-
tion, we can identify such “critical” lines and they potentially
trigger the cascading failure22–27. The size of the resultant
power system blackout is argued to follow the power-law dis-
tribution and it is reproduced by a model study28. Once a line
is overloaded, the line can be accidentally or intentionally (by
power grid operators) disconnected from the grid. In that case,
the load should be redistributed to other lines. The pattern of
the load redistribution is estimated by the line outage distri-
bution factor29,30 related to network properties. Various more
realistic aspects were adopted such as the power loss due to
the heat dissipation31, the noisy power input32, and the island-
ing phenomenon33.
The cascading propagation in the aforementioned studies is
represented as the series of discrete stationary states of dis-
tinct networks. For example, one can get a stationary state
of an original intact network to identify the most critical line.
Assuming that critical lines are broken due to the overload,
it is possible to simulate the rebound effect from the modified
network with the critical lines removed. By repeating this pro-
cess until there is no more overloaded line, one can estimate
the total size of cascading failure or power outage.
C. Dynamic behaviors with the AC approximation
As mentioned in Sec. II B, more detailed dynamic behav-
iors of power grids such as synchronization should be investi-
gated with the full consideration of the current’s synchronized
phase oscillation, i.e., the AC approximation. For instance,
the current flow of each link at a synchronized steady state
can be utilized to find the critical links34–39. The transient pat-
tern of nodes’ phase and frequency is also a crucial indicator
of critical behaviors40.
If finding the critical lines to prevent the power outage is
the main purpose of the DC approximation, it is possible to set
more sophisticated strategies to improve power grids’ perfor-
mance with this more realistic AC approximation. Rohden et
al.37 compared the strategies to heal the damaged power grid
and Tchawou et al.41 suggested a control strategy to maintain
the synchronization. Li et al.38 and Tchuisseu et al.42 tried to
improve power grids’ stability by optimization and dynamic
demand control, respectively. In addition, Witthaut et al.43
revealed that the cascading effect is not limited to nearby re-
gions and the long-range effects can occur due to cascading.
Moreover, modern power systems are becoming more com-
plex by the implementation of distributed renewable power
sources as a part of smart-grid systems. In this context, re-
searchers started to investigate the effect of the spatial or ge-
ographical distribution of power sources. For instance, stud-
3ies revealed that decentralized power systems are more stable
compared than centralized ones44–48. The control strategy to
maintain the grid’s synchronization was also investigated in
decentralized systems49. Some studies investigated the non-
trivial response of power grids, so called Braess’s paradox,
which refers to the phenomenon that removing a connection
can counterintuitively increase the overall transportation effi-
ciency35,41.
In the midst of those various topics, one would need mea-
sures to quantify the synchronization stability. In the follow-
ing subsection, we introduce one of such measures that cap-
tures researchers’ interest, which has eventually become the
cornerstone of our analysis in this work.
D. The synchronization stability
The AC flowing throughout power grids is supposed to be
synchronized at the rated frequency (mostly 50 or 60 Hz, de-
pending on the regional standard). In real power systems,
however, the phase of the AC may experience unexpected
disturbances that could hamper the systems’ synchrony. It is
challenging to analyze the synchronization stability due to its
nonlinear nature. For theoretical model studies to proceed, as
a standard procedure, we consider each node in power grids
as a phase oscillator with the phase of the AC flowing through
the node.
One can perturb a node’s phase and frequency in a power
grid and then count how many times the power-grid system re-
covers its overall synchronous state. Menck et al.1 suggested
this approach by measuring the probability of the synchro-
nization recovery against nodal perturbations, which is called
the basin stability. Assuming the principle of equal a priori
probabilities, the basin stability of a node also corresponds
to the fraction of configuration space composed of the node’s
phase and frequency disturbance from which the system re-
covers its synchrony. Since the perturbation is applied to each
node at a time, it is sometimes called the single-node basin
stability for technicality2, while the multiple-node basin sta-
bility50 refers to the result of simultaneous perturbations to
several nodes.
In terms of the basin stability, it is known that the specific
locations such as the terminal of the network branch, so-called
the dead-end or the dead-tree3, or the detour path2 tend to
cause lower synchronization stability than others. The bista-
bility of power-grid nodes is also analyzed over the state space
of nodes4,5. Based on the transient pattern in the state space,
different categories of the power-grid nodes in terms of topo-
logical roles are analyzed to show their distinct diagnostics in
the basin stability6. From a practical point of view, numeri-
cal studies on basin stability require heavy computational re-
sources due to its time complexity in exploring the state space,
so modified versions were developed to estimate the basin sta-
bility7 and sometimes with setting the finite-time limit51,52.
As introduced above, researchers have extensively ex-
ploited the basin stability as an iconic measure to quantify
the synchronization stability of power-grid nodes53. How-
ever, there is another crucial piece of information affecting the
dynamical behaviors of phase oscillators; the basin stability,
just as the order parameter of the conventional synchroniza-
tion model such as the Kuramoto model54, depends on the
transmission capacity between nodes (analogous to the cou-
pling constant as a control parameter in the Kuramoto model,
the details of which are presented in Sec. III A). For the past
couple of years, we have actively participated in the process
of incorporating the effects of transmission capacity into the
framework of basin stability to aim at a comprehensive under-
standing of the characteristics of basin stability8–10. Through-
out the series of work, we have discovered the relationship
between the basin stability and the node’s inconsistency in the
community membership8,55, the non-monotonic behavior of
the basin stability as a function of transmission capacity in
small building blocks of power grids9, and its possible con-
nection to chaotic dynamics10.
Based on our experience and insight gained throughout the
previous works, in this study, we take a step further toward
more lateral understanding in the whole picture of synchro-
nization stability of power grids. We begin with the intro-
duction to the theoretical background from the next section,
including the integrated measure of the basin (in)stability for
continuously varying values of transmission capacity.
III. METHODS
A. Synchronization dynamics: the swing equation
The phase synchronization dynamics between power-grid
nodes is usually described by the second-order Kuramoto-type
model with inertia, so-called the swing equation4,56–58:
θ¨i = ω˙i = Pi−αiθ˙i−∑
j
Ki jAi j sin(θi−θ j) , (1)
where the angular variable θi denotes the phase difference of
node i to the reference frame that is rotating with the rated
frequency. The net power input at node i is represented as Pi
such that a net power producer (consumer) has Pi > 0 (Pi < 0)
and a node with Pi = 0 does not inject or extract any electric
power to or from the grid but serves as a structural branching
point called a junction. The damping coefficient αi for the
energy dissipation is proportional to the deviation of the an-
gular frequency θ˙i = ωi of node i from the reference frame,
and the symmetric coupling term Ki j = K ji corresponds to the
transmission capacity of the transmission line between nodes i
and j. The symmetric adjacency matrix elements Ai j describe
the binary connection structure between nodes as Ai j = 1 if
a transmission line exists between nodes i and j, and Ai j = 0
otherwise. Note that in the synchronous state, the average
frequency deviation over all of the nodes vanishes such that
θ˙i = ωi = 0. This swing equation is widely used to analyti-
cally or numerically study the most essential aspects of elec-
trical power transmission in power grids.
4B. The basin stability
In real operation of power grids, their synchronous state can
be disturbed by external perturbations in terms of the phase
and the angular frequency of each node as a phase oscilla-
tor. Depending to the size of the perturbations, the system
can either recover its synchrony or fall into a limit cycle with
its synchrony broken. One can quantify the resilience of the
system’s synchronous state against the perturbations to each
node. A widely-used measure is the basin stability B, defined
as the fraction of the state space composed of the phase and
the angular frequency for each nodal oscillator, from which
the system recovers its synchrony3. In practice, one usually
estimates the basin stability numerically by sampling the state
space and simulating the swing equation.
It is important to understand that basin stability is a syn-
chronization stability measure assigned to each node, from
the entire system’s dynamics. In other words, it quantifies the
entire system’s synchronization stability in the case that the
perturbations are applied to the node. For instance, Bi = 1 im-
plies that the system always keeps its synchronization regard-
less of any disturbance to node i; when Bi = 0, any amount of
disturbance to node i breaks the entire system’s synchrony.
In this study, in order to numerically measure the basin sta-
bility of node i, we perturb each node by taking the phase
and angular frequency values from the configuration space
θi ∈ [−pi,pi) and ωi ∈ [−100,100], uniformly at random as
our previous studies (500 combinations of θi and ωi for each
K value)8–10. For simplicity, we fix the dissipation coefficient
αi = α = 0.1 for all of the nodes1–3. The numerical imple-
mentation is based on the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method59
with the convergence criteria |ωi| < 5× 10−2 for every node
i2.
C. Integrated basin instability
Various parameters introduced in Sec. III A, such as the dis-
sipation coefficient αi, the transmission capacity Ki j, and the
net power input Pi, affect the basin stability. For instance,
in general, the smaller the dissipation coefficient is, the more
easily synchronization occurs5. In this work, we focus on the
transmission capacity Ki j of each connection between nodes
i and j, as the main control parameter. A power grid cannot
maintain its synchronous state when the transmission capacity
between its elements is too small, whereas once the transmis-
sion capacity exceeds a certain threshold, the system usually
remains synchronized with the theoretically maximum basin
stability of unity3,60. Such a transition pattern depending on
the transmission capacity is also in accordance with the phase
transition of the original Kuramoto model54.
However, it was also reported that some systems show
counterintuitive non-monotonic behaviors8–10. Therefore, we
cannot simply find a single threshold value of transmission ca-
pacity by just detecting the “jump” of the basin stability and
assume that the threshold value would characterize the sys-
tem completely. Instead, we have to carefully scan a wide
range of transmission capacity to obtain the whole picture of
the transition pattern of the basin stability. Of course, it would
be the best to show the whole transition shape without any
information loss, as done in our previous works8–10, but it is
cumbersome to take the entire functional shape as a measure
of stability, e.g., when we try to compare it with other topo-
logical or dynamical characteristics of power grids.
Motivated by such a trade-off between the accuracy in de-
scription and practicality, we introduce a collective measure
of basin stability encompassing the entire range of transmis-
sion capacity. One could simply integrate Bi from K = 0 until
the threshold value of K at which Bi(K) reaches unity. How-
ever, the threshold K value is distinct for each node, so setting
the different upper bound for every node can be tricky and
not practical. Instead, we use the integral of 1−B (the pink
shaded area over the curves in the central part of Fig. 1) as the
integrated basin instability (IBI):
Ci =
∫ ∞
0
[1−Bi(K)]dK , (2)
where the convergence of Ci is guaranteed as long as Bi(K) =
1 for K larger than a certain finite threshold value.
Figure 1 shows the schematic diagram of the entire process
of measuring Ci, from the pedagogical description of the basin
stability itself. Given a power grid, one can perturb a node by
applying the initial perturbation uniformly at random from the
state space composed of the phase and angular frequency for
each K value. The fraction of the configuration space that
enables the recovery of synchronization is the basin stability
of node i, denoted by Bi(K) (corresponding to the area filled
with the light cyan color in the top diagram of Fig. 1). We
illustrate the process of measuring basin stability of node n1
at K = k1, k2, and k3, which is denoted by Bn1(k1), Bn1(k2),
and Bn1(k3), respectively. Adjusting the K values from K = 0
to a large K value exceeding the threshold, we obtain the tran-
sition curve of Bi(K), which we call the transition window8.
As the final step to calculating the IBI, we perform the in-
tegration of 1−Bi(K) over the range of K, or the area over
the transition window. In this study, we scan K by every
∆K = 0.1 and numerically perform the integration based on
the composite trapezoidal method61 without the error term:∫ b
a f (x)dx≈ ∑ j=1[ f (x j−1)+ f (x j)]∆x/2, where ∆x = 0.1. By
using the power-grid models that we will introduce from now
on, we will present topological and dynamical factors to de-
termine the IBI.
IV. POWER-GRID MODELS
A power grid is usually a single connected component con-
sisting of power producers, consumers, and junctions. How-
ever, the supply-demand relationship between power produc-
ers and consumers can be locally formed to establish small
self-sustaining clusters in practice33. Such small clusters can
be operated autonomously even when other parts of the power
grid are damaged, which in fact supports the resilience of
the entire power grid in return. Therefore, small power-grid
motifs can be taken as the minimal functional unit of power
grids9,10. In this spirit, we use two types of simple model
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FIG. 1. In this illustration, we schematically show the overall procedure of measuring the basin stability and the integrated basin instability for
each node.
networks for our comprehensive investigation of the factors
affecting the synchronization stability: 5-node motifs as the
basic building blocks of power grids9 and the IEEE 24-bus
model as a real power grid, whose compactness enables the
extensive analysis.
First, we take the four distinct forms of 5-node motifs as
shown in Fig. 2(a), which enumerate all of the possible cases
of the four interconnected consumers and a single producer
attached to one of the consumers. We choose this particular
example to focus on the effect of the bottleneck or gate-keeper.
For the balance of power production and consumption, the
power producer has the net input power Pi = 4 and the four
consumers have the net output power Pi =−1, which satisfies
Kirchhoff’s circuit law of power conservation, i.e., ∑i Pi = 0.
For the 5-node motifs, we measure the basin stability values
for the transmission capacity uniformly assigned to all of the
edges, in the range 0≤ K ≤ 80.
As a more realistic power grid model, we use the IEEE re-
liability test system (RTS)11,12. The IEEE RTS is a conven-
tional set of model power systems for testing various aspects
of power grids in engineering, including the stability analy-
sis of power grids22–25,63. In this study, we particularly use
the updated single area RTS-96 with 24 buses62 that reflects
the recent features of modern power grids such as small scale
wind farms. This IEEE RTS 24-bus system (IEEE 24-bus)
consists of 24 buses with 10 generators, 17 loads, and 3 trans-
formers. Each bus, denoted by the indices in the circuit repre-
sentation in Fig. 2(b), is composed of a localized set of possi-
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FIG. 2. The power-grid model networks we use in this work. (a)
The 5-node motifs consist of a single power producers connected to
a single consumer, with all of the possible connection configurations
between the four consumers. The power producers (the coral red
rectangles) supply four units of power to satisfy the a unit of demand
of the four consumers (the turquoise blue circles). (b) The original
IEEE 24-bus model above consists of 10 power generators, 17 loads,
and 3 transformers. We convert it to the network model below with
the 9 net producers (the coral red rectangles), the 11 net consumers
(the turquoise blue circles), and the 3 junction nodes (the dark gray
points). For both models, the codes in each node indicate the indices
used in the main text.
bly multiple facilities of generators that provide power, loads
that consume power, and transformers that relay power with-
out any loss (ideally).
In order to use the IEEE 24-bus data as a network repre-
sentation composed of three types of nodes (producers, con-
TABLE I. The input power Pi in an arbitrary unit and the role of each
node in the IEEE 24-bus network. The values are taken from the
original data62. The node indices correspond to the ones (after ‘B’)
in the network representation shown in Fig. 2.
Node Pi Role Node Pi Role
1 0.2375 Producer 13 2.77125 Producer
2 0.3725 Producer 14 −2.295 Consumer
3 −2.12625 Consumer 15 −1.59625 Consumer
4 −0.8775 Consumer 16 0.36875 Producer
5 −0.84375 Consumer 17 0 Junction
6 −1.62 Consumer 18 0.05125 Producer
7 2.015 Producer 19 −2.16 Consumer
8 −2.025 Consumer 20 −1.51875 Consumer
9 −2.05875 Consumer 21 4.0 Producer
10 −2.295 Consumer 22 3.0 Producer
11 0 Junction 23 6.60 Producer
12 0 Junction 24 0 Junction
TABLE II. The reference transmission capacity κi j in an arbitrary
unit assigned to each edge between i and j. The values are taken
from the original data62. The node indices correspond to the ones
(after ‘B’) in the network representation shown in Fig. 2.
i j Capacity i j Capacity
1 2 1.75 11 13 5.00
1 3 1.75 11 14 5.00
1 5 3.50 12 13 5.00
2 4 1.75 12 23 5.00
2 6 1.75 13 23 5.00
3 9 1.75 14 16 5.00
3 24 4.00 15 16 5.00
4 9 1.75 15 21 10.00
5 10 3.50 15 24 5.00
6 10 1.75 16 17 5.00
7 8 3.50 16 19 5.00
8 9 1.75 17 18 5.00
8 10 1.75 17 22 5.00
9 11 4.00 18 21 10.00
9 12 4.00 19 20 10.00
10 11 4.00 20 23 10.00
10 12 4.00 21 22 5.00
sumers, and junctions) that fits our framework, we treat indi-
vidual buses as the nodes (we will call each bus a node accord-
ingly), and assign the net input value Pi to each node i as the
net sum of (positive) power generation and (negative) load be-
longing to the corresponding node. Each node in the network
representation in Fig. 2(b) is indicated with the corresponding
bus index (after ‘B’) in the circuit representation. With this
representation, we have 9 net producers with Pi > 0 (the coral
red rectangles in the bottom of Fig. 2(b)), 11 net consumers
with Pi < 0 (the turquoise blue circles), and 4 junction nodes
with Pi = 0 (the dark gray points), which constitute the 24
nodes in total. We use the value of the maximum power in the
original data62 as the input power of the generators. For the
loads, since the original data62 provides only the relative share
of load distribution, we divide the total generation according
to each of the relative fraction assigned to each load, and then
7set them as the amount of power consumption of the loads. Fi-
nally, as described above, we aggregate the total input power
of the generators and the total power consumed at the loads
belonging to node i, to set the net sum as the input parameter
Pi of node i. For the sake of computational cost, we rescale the
net input values Pi of the reference data by one tenth, while
keeping the relative ratio between them. See Table I for the
actual Pi values (dimensionless due to the rescaling) assigned
to each node.
In addition to the Pi values taken from the real data as men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, we also make use of the
real values of transmission capacity from the data source62.
One crucial difference is that the transmission capacity is the
control parameter we should adjust in the dynamical model.
Therefore, we take the maximum transmission capacity val-
ues assigned to each edge described in the IEEE 24-bus data62
and control the Ki j values proportional to each of the maxi-
mum capacity value as the reference. More specifically, we
use the scaling factor r as the real control parameter multi-
plied to the reference transmission capacity κi j for each edge
between nodes i and j, such that Ki j = rκi j where 0≤ r ≤ 20.
Again, we use the rescaled (dimensionless) value of transmis-
sion capacity for the sake of computation (1/100 of the actual
values62 in the unit of megawatt in this case). See Table II for
the actual values of κi j used in this study.
With this setup, we obtain the power flow at each transmis-
sion line of the 5-node motifs and the IEEE 24-bus network
based on the phase angle of each node at the synchronous
steady state:
Fi j = Ki j sin(θi−θ j) , (3)
where Fi j is the current flow from i to j. The power flow helps
us to see the overall flow direction and is related to the current
flow betweenness centrality (CFBC)64. We cross-check the
current flow from the swing equation with the power flow ob-
tained from the Python package PyPSA65, and the results are
the same. In practice, the PyPSA package takes the electrical
reactance Xi j as an input parameter instead of the transmission
capacity Ki j. The two quantities are related as Ki j =ViVj/Xi j
where Vi is the amplitude of AC voltage on node i45. As the
default setting of the amplitude is uniformly assigned as Vi = 1
for all of the nodes, we utilize the relation Xi j = 1/Ki j as the
voltage information is missing in the data66.
V. RESULTS
From the the patterns of the basin stability transition of the
5-node motifs shown in Fig. 3, we find that both the topo-
logical structure and the power flow affect the transition pat-
tern. On the left side, the transition window of each node is
illustrated inside the node corresponding to the position in the
topology, also marked by the node indices shared by Figs. 2(a)
and 3. In each motif, the producer node is located on the
most left side (the coral red color) and the consumer nodes
are on the right side (the turquoise blue color). For all of the
four configurations, the producer nodes fail to reach unity un-
til K = 80 whereas most of the consumer nodes have reached
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FIG. 3. The basin stability transition of the 5-node motifs and the
current flow at the steady state. On the left side, the basin stabil-
ity transition window inside each node, whose index corresponds to
each node in Fig. 2(a), is presented for 0 ≤ K ≤ 80, where the net-
work structure is illustrated between the nodes outside the transition
windows as well. The direction and amount of positive current flow
at the synchronous steady state is marked on the right side with the ar-
rows and the numbers on the edges, while the undirected dashed lines
represent the inactive links without any power flow. The flow direc-
tion is from K = 20, but it is not altered within the range 6≤K ≤ 80.
The coral red nodes (N1, N6, N11, and N16) are the power produc-
ers and the turquoise blue nodes (N2–N5, N7–N10, N12–N15, and
N17–N20) are the consumers.
B = 1 at K < 80 except for the nodes that connect the pro-
ducer and the consumer-node group (N2, N7, N12, and N17).
Considering the disproportionately large share of the power
production concentrated to a single node (four times as much
as the power consumption at each consumer node), we can
conclude that the value of Pi distributed throughout a power-
grid network seems to affect the synchronization stability.
On the right side of Fig. 3, we show the direction and
amount of current flow at the steady state of each motif. The
four units of power in total is distributed to the four consumer
(sink) nodes to which one unit of power per node is consumed.
Note that not all of the lines are used to transfer power, and the
inactive edges without any power flow are represented by the
undirected dashed lines. In all of the four motifs, the power
flows from the producer to the consumers through a single in-
termediary gate-keeper nodes (N2, N7, N12, and N17). It is
interesting to see that the basin stability of those gate keeper
nodes are notably small throughout the whole range of K val-
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FIG. 4. The basin stability transition of the IEEE 24-bus network. (a) Each panel inside each node represents the basin stability transition
window of the node for 0 ≤ r ≤ 20. All of the panels share the legend shown at the bottom left. The panels (b) and (c) show the network
illustration of IEEE 24-bus with the color-coded values of Ci and |Pi|, respectively. The arrow between the nodes in the panels (a), (b), and
(c) indicates the direction of power flow. (d) The values of Ci are correlated with the absolute value of input/output power |Pi| more strongly
with the Pearson correlation coefficient 0.84 and the p-value 3.4×10−7 (corresponding to the null hypothesis of no correlation) than any other
network measures such as degree, current flow betweenness centrality (CFBC), and communicability (CM).
ues compared to the rest of the consumer nodes, which we
call the gate-keeper effect. Since the gate-keeper nodes have
to handle the lion’s share of power flow, they play a crucial
role in terms of the power distribution. Therefore, it is intu-
itively understandable that the perturbations on those nodes
are likely to cause severe consequences.
We show that the two main results from the 5-node mo-
tifs: the effects of the input power Pi and the gate-keeper loca-
tion are also observed in the IEEE 24-bus model. Figure 4(a)
shows the transition window of the basin stability of each node
in the IEEE 24-bus network. The nodes in the network show
distinct transition patterns as the rescaled transmission capac-
ity parameter r varies, because each node has its own values
of power input/output and a unique topological attribute. For
instance, perturbation to some nodes, B1, B2, B11, B12, B17,
and B24 shown in Fig. 4(a), barely destroys the global syn-
chronization even at relatively small r. On the other hand,
B23 does not achieve B = 1 even at the maximum transmis-
sion capacity r = 20 in our simulation, at which most of nodes
reach B = 1. This unique behavior of B23 yields the largest
IBI value Ci=B23 defined in Eq. (2), for that particular node.
Note that the node B23 also has the largest input among all
of the nodes as listed in Table I. Besides this single case, we
statistically find that the IBI values are correlated with the ab-
solute value of power input/output values |Pi| (with the Pear-
son correlation coefficient 0.84 and the p-value 3.4× 10−7)
more strongly than with any other network properties we ex-
amine such as degree, CFBC64, and communicability (CM)67,
as shown in Figs. 4(b) and 4(c), and Table III.
In contrast to the 5-node motifs, the original IEEE 24-bus
model does not have such an extreme case of gate-keeper
nodes. To validate the gate-keeper effect observed in the 5-
node motifs, we slightly modify the IEEE 24-bus model by
eliminating three edges to enforce the gate-keeper structure:
the edges between B1 and B5, between B2 and B6, and be-
tween B15 and B21 (see Fig. 5 for the modified structure). As
a result of the removal of the three edges, we indeed find the
gate-keeper effect. If we compare the nodes b10 and b17 to
their counterparts (B10 and B17) in the original network in
Fig. 4, their IBI values of the former are notably larger than
the latter as a result. In particular, the anomalous peak10 in
B10 disappears in b10, which indicates the overall change in
the transition pattern. The strong correlation between Ci and
|Pi| still remains, as shown in Fig. 5(d) with the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient 0.747758 and the p-value 2.7×10−5.
TABLE III. Three types of correlation coefficients and the p-value
(corresponding to the null hypothesis of no correlation) between Ci
and dynamical and structure variables: |Pi|, degree, CFBC, and CM.
Type Ci vs Coefficient the p-value
Pearson
|Pi| 0.837050 3.416144×10−7
Degree −0.052311 8.081958×10−1
CFBC −0.166695 4.362666×10−1
CM −0.123147 5.664562×10−1
Spearman
|Pi| 0.866858 4.282807×10−8
Degree −0.102113 6.349359×10−1
CFBC −0.196564 3.572674×10−1
CM −0.103478 6.303951×10−1
Kendall
|Pi| 0.708315 1.574424×10−6
Degree −0.076613 6.348642×10−1
CFBC −0.134301 3.585951×10−1
CM −0.050725 7.283948×10−1
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FIG. 5. The basin stability transition of the modified version of the original IEEE 24-bus network. All of the plots show the same type of
information with Fig. 4. The values of Ci and |Pi| show strong correlation with the Pearson correlation coefficient 0.747758 and the p-value
2.7×10−5 (corresponding to the null hypothesis of no correlation). The gate-keeper effect appears at b10 and b17, if we compared them with
B10 and B17 in Fig. 4.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the transition pattern of basin stabil-
ity to understand the landscape of synchronization stability of
power-grid nodes in a comprehensive manner. By integrat-
ing the basin instability (1−B) to define the concept of the
integrated basin instability (IBI), we have represented each
node’s instability across different values of transmission ca-
pacity. With the 5-node motifs and the IEEE 24-bus model as
the representative cases of building blocks of localized power
grids and real power grids in engineering, respectively, we find
that the nodes with the larger values of input/output power
tend to have the larger IBI, i.e., more unstable in terms of
perturbation. It implies that concentration of disproportion-
ately large amount of power generation at a single location in a
power grid can be dangerous, as such a facility would be more
fragile in response to external perturbation. This may sound
intuitive, but we would like to emphasize that such heteroge-
neous distribution of input/output power besides the topologi-
cal characteristics has not been systematically investigated un-
der the condition of fluctuating transmission capacity in many
previous studies.
On the topological side as well, the dynamical variable of
the current flow is deeply related to the synchronization sta-
bility. For instance, we have found that perturbation to nodes
located at the position where the current flow is concentrated
easily break the system’s synchronization. This gives a hint
to improve the power grid’s stability, e.g., designers of power
grids should prepare bypasses for electric current to flow in
various paths to avoid a small number of gate-keeper nodes.
As the first step toward the understanding of more real as-
pects of power grids, our result is based on one of the power-
grid models of the IEEE reliability test system. More rigorous
model analyses both in terms of quality and quantity would
help to understand the general relationship between the topol-
ogy and synchronization stability of power grids as it has been
done in the DC power grid68. Another challenge is the fact
that the calculation of IBI requires extensive numerical costs,
so the development of more efficient algorithms to estimate
the comprehensive basin stability is necessary, which can also
be one of the future directions of this important research topic
affecting our entire civilization.
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